DEGREES OF COMPETITION, THE RATE OF RETURN AND GROWTH FROM A CLASSICAL/SRAFFIAN PERSPECTIVE by White, Graham
  
 
 
Economics Working Paper Series 
2011-3 
 
 
 
DEGREES OF COMPETITION, THE RATE OF 
RETURN AND GROWTH FROM A 
CLASSICAL/SRAFFIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Graham White 
 
                                  
 
February 2011 
 
1 
 
DEGREES OF COMPETITION, THE RATE OF RETURN AND GROWTH FROM A 
CLASSICAL/SRAFFIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Graham White, 
School of Economics 
University of Sydney, 
Australia 
 
February, 2011 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of the paper is a clarification of the concept of competition from a classical/ Sraffian 
perspective; including an elucidation of how a classical/Sraffian approach might go about defining the 
degree of competition. This in turn allows for a sharper contrast between the Sraffian view of 
competition and mainstream views. 
 
The starting point for the analysis is the work of Clifton which interprets the classical/Sraffian view of 
competition as more general than that of orthodoxy: one which can encompass competition between 
production units in a given industry as something constrained by more dominant forms of competition 
such as that between production units across industries for shares of the corporate surplus. Following 
on from the work of both Clifton and Semmler, and starting from the assumption that multi-divisional 
corporation is the relevant “firm”, and that the corporate target rate of return is the relevant rate of 
profit, the question arises as to what determines the latter. And this question has received very little 
attention outside the more traditional post-Keynesian literature on pricing. 
 
The paper explores what is probably the most serious attempt within this literature - in the work of 
Eichner - to explain the target rate, in terms the desired growth rate of the corporation. This 
proposition has some interesting implications for a Sraffian approach, not least because it allows a 
link running from the expected growth of the economy to the target rate and thus the rate of profit. 
This in turn requires a discussion of the consistency of such a link with the Sraffian critique of the 
Cambridge growth equation.  As well, a link between the target rate of return and the desired 
corporate growth rate link also has implications for the mechanics by which sectoral profit rates 
converge and thus for the classical/Sraffian literature on cross-dual dynamics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
DEGREES OF COMPETITION, THE RATE OF RETURN AND GROWTH FROM A 
CLASSICAL/SRAFFIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of the paper is a clarification of the concept of competition from a classical or 
Sraffian perspective; including an elucidation of how a classical/Sraffian approach might go 
about defining the degree of competition. In turn, it is intended that this may allow for a  
sharper contrast between the Sraffian view of competition and mainstream views. 
  
The motivation for this reconsideration has three elements. The first is the general theme 
within mainstream macroeconomics of the last three decades that key macroeconomic results 
are inextricably linked to the existence of imperfect competition primarily in (though not 
limited to) product markets. The second is the critique of orthodox macroeconomic 
propositions – not the least being the proposition of a long-run tendency to full-employment 
triggered by wage and price flexibility (Garegnani, 1978; Eatwell and Milgate, 1983; see also 
White, 2004) - which a classical/Sraffian inspired approach to value and distribution allows. 
The third element is the relative absence of any consideration within the Sraffian literature of 
“differing degrees” of competition. In the view of the author, consideration along these lines 
may in turn provide for an enhanced critical perspective on a centerpiece of modern 
macroeconomics. In other words, additionally to the Sraffian-based rejection of the orthodox 
belief in a spontaneous tendency to full-employment, one may be able to provide a Sraffian 
perspective on the relation between degrees of competition and macroeconomic outcomes; 
one which can be contrasted with that of orthodox theory. 
 
The present paper is intended as a first step along these lines: firstly, to spell out what 
alternative a classical/Sraffian perspective on competition could offer to the orthodox 
juxtaposition of perfect and imperfect competition; secondly, to deduce from this 
implications about pricing and competition and about “welfare” and competition which 
would allow comparison with orthodoxy; and, thirdly, to consider what a Sraffian perspective 
might offer in regard to the relation between the degree of competition and macroeconomic 
outcomes. 
The starting point for the analysis is a discussion of the work of both Clifton and Semmler 
(Sections 2 and 3) which interprets the classical/Sraffian view of competition as more general 
than that of orthodoxy: one which can encompass competition between production units in a 
given industry as something constrained by more dominant forms of competition such as that 
between production units across industries for shares of the corporate surplus. Following on 
from the work of both Clifton and Semmler, and starting from the assumption that multi-
divisional corporation is the relevant “firm”, and that the corporate target rate of return is the 
relevant rate of profit, the question arises as to what determines the latter - a question which 
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appears to have received very little attention outside the more traditional post-Keynesian 
literature on pricing. 
 
This question is taken up in Section 4 with a consideration of what is probably the most 
serious attempt within this literature - the work of Eichner - to explain the target rate, in terms 
the desired growth rate of the corporation. This proposition has some interesting implications 
for a Sraffian approach, not least because it allows a link running from the expected growth 
of the economy to the target rate and thus the rate of profit. This in turn requires a discussion 
of the consistency of such a link with the Sraffian critique of the Cambridge growth equation. 
This question is addressed in Section 5.  Section 6 takes up a further question raised by a link 
running from  the expected growth rate to the target rate of return, namely, what implications 
such a link has for the mechanics by which sectoral profit rates converge and thus for the 
classical/Sraffian literature on cross-dual dynamics. Section 7 takes up yet another 
implication of a link between growth and the target rate, viz., the relation between the degree 
of competition and macroeconomics. This discussion in turn has some bearing on New 
Keynesian arguments about the significance of imperfect competition for the relevance of 
aggregate demand in influencing output. Section 8 provides a brief account of what the 
preceding discussion suggests by way of a classical/Sraffian perspective on orthodox link 
between welfare and intra-industry competition. Section 9 provides some brief concluding 
notes. 
 
2. Degrees of competition: a classical/Sraffian perspective, á la Clifton 
 
As is well known, a classical/Sraffian approach to value and distribution does bring with it a 
conception of competition: the notion of competition implied by the Sraffian approach is of 
the old classical idea of ‘free competition’ (Kurz and Salvadori, 1995, Ch. 1), consistent with 
a uniform rate of profit across sectors. Thus, if one was seeking to derive implications from 
this standpoint about measuring the degree of competition one might reasonably start by 
defining competition on the basis of the extent to which capital - however organized - is free 
to move in seeking its highest rate of return. From this angle, the classical/Sraffian 
counterpart to the orthodox perfect versus imperfect competition comparison would seem to 
be a comparison between “free or unrestricted competition” on the one hand, where 
ultimately mobility of capital will generate a uniform rate of profit across production 
processes, and, on the other hand, “restricted competition” where restrictions on the mobility 
of capital allow differentials in profit rate (in the absence of risk and illiquidity) to persist 
and/or a higher average rate of profit across sectors compared with the absence of such 
restrictions.  
 
Now it is also well known that the assumption of persistent profit rate differentials poses no 
fundamental obstacle to the Sraffian analysis of relative prices1
                                               
1 Indeed, in the absence of mobility barriers but with allowances for differences in risk, long-un profit rates 
would not be uniform across production processes.  
, and thus nor should the 
notion of restricted competition associated with entry and/or exit barriers permitting 
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persistent differentials in profit rates. The complexity in this case will arise in respect of the 
implications of such differentials for the price structure and the pattern of mark-ups (cf. 
Semmler, 1984). 
 
It is worthwhile asking however whether we can take things further than this; viz., further 
than the crude restricted versus unrestricted competition classification suggested above. In 
particular, what if anything is suggested about market and/or firm structures by the 
classical/Sraffian approach.2 This is not an unimportant question in terms of juxtaposing a 
Sraffian approach with that of orthodoxy, since competition in the latter approach is 
inextricably bound up with the theory of the firm; in particular with questions about the size 
and number of such firms which constitute an “industry”.3
 
  
In the view of the present author, an answer to this question best begins from the analysis of 
Clifton (1977, 1983). In two separate papers Clifton suggests that the notion of competition 
implicit in Sraffa’s Production of Commodities is particularly suited to an analysis of a world 
of multi-divisional corporations and not less-suited as would be the claims of some post-
Keynesian economists and presumably also marginalist theory. He suggests moreover, 
following Marx, that competition, in terms of the pressure faced by any production unit from 
other units for shares in aggregate profit is likely to be strengthened with the maturity of 
capitalism. Significantly, the implication is that competition, as it is implied by a classical-
Sraffian standpoint, intensifies with the development of capitalism and this intensification 
occurs alongside a trend towards increasing concentration. In fact as others (e.g. Eichner, 
1983) have suggested, the increasing size associated with concentration is in fact part of the 
means of strengthening those very forces which would allocate capital across production 
activities.4
To be clear, Clifton’s analysis entails a view of the firm not merely as a competitor with other 
firms producing substitute products but more importantly as a production unit subservient to 
forces of competition for shares in aggregate profit flows across different industries; and that 
strength of these latter forces were tied in direct proportion to the development of the modern 
corporation. In his 1983 paper, Clifton provides a telling example (by way of a case study of 
General Motors) of the significance of corporate development with respect to financial 
control for pricing. The picture that emerges from this particular case study is the dominating 
 
                                               
2 An interesting comment in this regard comes from Petri to the effect that, “Sraffa’s analysis does have 
implications for the theory of the firm, … but these implications are indirect …. It is in [the] much greater 
compatibility of the classical approach with realistic analyses of firm behaviour that [these] implications … 
appear to lie” (1990, p. 177). As is argued below, to the extent that the “firm” can be thought of as the modern 
multi-divisional corporation, Clifton’s analysis would suggest that this “greater compatibility” lies in the parallel 
between the forces which drive the allocation of resources within the corporation and which thereby govern its 
broad pricing policy on the one hand and the forces which regulate differentials in profit rates and relative prices 
in the classical conception of competition, on the other hand. 
3 Interestingly, the classical/Sraffian approach does provide for some connection with the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm of industrial organisation theory; and not only in terms of the latter making use of 
classical ideas (cf. Glick and Ochoa, 1988). 
4 In fact, the consistency of increasing concentration and increasing competition has not gone unnoticed by those 
working in more orthodox directions (e.g. Marris, 1983, p. 674). 
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concern by ‘capital’ in the form of the corporate head office to allocate the corporate surplus 
– and thus the relative expansion and contraction of different constituent production units - in 
line with performance judged against the corporate target rate of return. Not surprisingly, 
Clifton interpreted “this administered price system [as] … the modern institutional means by 
which ‘market prices are regulated by price of production’ in the corporate economy. Such 
administered [price systems] … may exist under either competitive conditions or monopoly, 
but their distinctive feature is their role as a centre of gravity around which market conditions 
fluctuate” (1983, p. 25). 
This certainly seemed to provide at the least the beginnings of an answer to the question 
posed by Levine in 1991: “[d]oes the Sraffa model have implications for decision-making 
behavior and process at the level of the firm” (p. 168). Clifton’s answer in a sense turns this 
question on its head: the multi-product, multi-divisional corporation as a decision making 
body reinforces the tendencies which are implied in the assumption of a uniform rate of profit 
in the Sraffa system. Put another way, the multi-product, multi-divisional corporation 
provides the main conduit by which the tendencies implicit in Sraffa’s  assumption of a 
uniform rate of profit are expressed in modern capitalism. 
It is worthwhile noting here that this role of the corporate head office is viewed by Clifton as 
consistent with different degrees of intra-industry competition. The regulation of market 
prices “by price of production” is present regardless of the nature of the competitive struggle 
within markets. If the former process is to be seen as part of the general competitive process 
in capitalist economies, then (again, following Marx) competition is not co-extensive with the 
theory of the firm (as a production unit defined by product type). It is difficult not to interpret 
Clifton’s view as one which finds the classical/Sraffian approach more general than orthodox 
analyses of competition; in being able encompass the competition between production units 
in a given industry as something constrained by more dominant forms of competition. 
One might take this reasoning a step further: if it can be argued that the activities of the 
“firm” as a production unit are subject to competition not merely from within the “market” 
but from outside the “market” (e.g. by competing divisions within the same corporation) then 
one might also define/measure the degree of competition in terms of a hieracrchy in three 
components or levels of competition: (i) competition between production units producing 
substitute commodities; (ii) competitive influences on price and output decisions of the 
production unit dictated by competition for corporate profit (or a corresponding “centre” of 
capital which transcends the “industry”); (iii) the forces determining the pattern of 
differentials between corporate rates of return; with (iii), (ii) and (i) in order of dominance 
3. Prices and the rate of profit 
In a formal multi-commodity framework, the implications of the above view for relative 
prices were clarified, both for the single-product and joint-product cases, a number of years 
ago most noteably by Semmler (1984). This analysis provides a fairly clear connection 
between the Sraffian price system and the arguments of Clifton and others as to the 
significance of the corporation: the rate of profit in the Sraffian system can be interpreted as 
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the corporate target rate of return, so that with a given technique, including normal rates of 
capacity utilization, once the pattern of corporate target rates is fixed, relative prices and 
hence the pattern of mark-ups is fully-determined.  
However, the formal clarity of this result masks a number of questions, not least concerning 
the forces which govern the corporate target rate of return; and how the answer to that 
question would stand in relation to other research in the broader Sraffian research program 
about what governs the rate of profit, assuming that the latter is the appropriate exogenous 
distributive variable in the Sraffian price system.  
Further, supposing that for a mature capitalist economy, the rate of profit is to be interpreted 
as a corporate target rate of return, what are the forces responsible for regulating the size of 
differentials in target rates of return and thus the degree of movement in relative prices in 
relation to their “long-period” vector? The question of what forces dictate profit rate 
differentials and relative prices movements from a classical standpoint has of course also 
been addressed extensively in the last thirty years formally in terms of the literature on 
gravitation or “cross-dual dynamics”. It is nonetheless worth considering the implications of 
a target return approach in relation to this literature: the latter typically has causation running 
from changes in relative prices (sparked by movements in demand relative to supply) to 
changes in the pattern of profit rate differentials. Interpreting profit rates as target rates of 
return however means that prices are set so as to generate a predetermined rate of return 
(usually at a normal rate of capacity utilization). Thus the waxing and waning of different 
sectors must react directly on those target rates, but the precise mechanics of this remain to be 
clarified.5
A separate set of questions arises in relation to trends in economic thinking (referred to 
earlier) of a more orthodox flavor; specifically, the economic significance of “less” rather 
than “more” competition, not only in terms of welfare (however this might be defined from a  
classical/Sraffian standpoint) but also in terms of the macro phenomena. On this point, the 
hierarchy of levels of competition referred to above might suggest that the interesting 
question is not the orthodox one concerning the precise relation between imperfect 
competition and macroeconomic phenomena, such as the ability of aggregate demand shocks 
to influence aggregate output and employment. This question seems much less clear cut not 
least because of the complexity in defining “imperfect competition” when thinking in terms 
of the different levels of competition referred to above. Rather it would suggest as the more  
interesting question the significance for example of  the dominance of pricing and output 
decisions by corporate concerns about growth and diversification for macro outcomes; or, as 
is discussed below, the significance of macro phenomena in the determination of prices.  
 
In attempting to provide some answer these questions we start by reflecting further on the 
rate of profit as a target rate of return.  
                                               
5 Though one attempt in this direction is Boggio, 1992.  
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4. The target rate of return 
The focus of our discussion of the target rate of return is not so much on the role of the target 
rate of return and thus the rate of profit in the formal determination of relative prices. As 
noted above issues to do with the latter have already been considerably explored and the 
analysis is comparatively straightforward. The focus here instead is on the much less 
explored question of what determines the target rate of return itself.   
On this question, Clifton himself provides some insight from his case study of the pricing 
practices at General Motors, though it takes us only so far. Reproducing the Clifton’s 
quotation from Donaldson Brown (a key architect of those pricing practices), “an acceptable 
theory of pricing must be to gain over a protracted period of time a margin of profit which 
represents the highest attainable return commensurate with capital turnover and the 
enjoyment of wholesome expansion, with adequate regard to the economic consequences of 
fluctuating volume” (Clifton, 1983, p.28).  
As has been suggested elsewhere (White, 1996a), the words “with adequate regard to the 
economic consequences of fluctuating volume” imply that the economic return attainable is a 
rate calculated on an average or “normal” or “standard” rate of capacity utilization over a 
number of cycles. And this point is fairly uncontroversial now within the Sraffian-inspired 
literature. 
Less clear is the phrase “highest attainable return commensurate with capital turnover and the 
enjoyment of wholesome expansion”. Some hint on this is provided by another quote from 
Brown:  “[t]he supply of capital whether from retention of earnings or from a sale of 
securities, is dependent upon the promise of a satisfactory rate of return…” (ibid., p. 31). 
These words suggest a link between the growth of the corporation and the rate of return; a 
link which is bound up with the financing of the corporation’s growth rate. Indeed, in the 
discussion which immediately precedes this quote Clifton refers to the dominance of General 
Motors price policy by “the investment behavior of the corporation” (ibid., p. 30).  
A not unreasonable interpretation of Clifton’s discussion would emphasise the inextricable 
connection between the “economic return attainable” and the growth rate of the corporate 
entity. And this has two elements in Clifton’s discussion: first, the allocation of finance for 
expansion between divisions of the corporation on the basis of a comparison of divisional 
rates of return and the corporation’s “economic return attainable”; and, second (as has been 
suggested above), the growth plans of the corporation being the key determinant of the 
economic return attainable. 
However, this is as far as Clifton’s analysis takes us in terms of an explanation of the target 
rate: a more precise relation between the corporate target rate of return and the corporate 
growth rate needs to be sought elsewhere. Interestingly it is on this question that what have 
hitherto been seen alternative approaches (at least on the subject of pricing) – Sraffian and 
post-Keynesian – may find common ground. Specifically, the link between corporate growth 
and the corporate target rate of return has been pursued most in the post-Keynesian literature 
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by Alfred Eichner. It is worth reflecting at least briefly on Eichner’s position as it offers some 
interesting implications pertinent to the broader Sraffian research program.  
For Eichner, the evolution of the corporation has allowed capital to take a form which 
provides for its continuous expansion; and this is the purpose of the corporate target rate. 
Thus, “[i]f competitive forces, such as those usually assumed in orthodox theory preclude an 
industry from achieving that size mark-up [consistent with the target rates of return for the 
megcorp], then one of the necessary conditions for continuous expansion over time will not 
be met. This point goes far toward explaining why the type of economic system represented 
by the orthodox theory has evolved into the corporate economy” (1983, p.146).6
There is a clear parallel here in relation to the views of Clifton canvassed above. Eichner’s 
use of the words “one of the necessary conditions for continuous expansion” is similar to the 
sentiment in Donaldson Brown’s words above (p.7) to the effect that pricing must serve the 
corporation’s goals relating to expansion.  
 As such, 
“the [megacorp’s] desired growth rate, adjusted to take into account any corporate profits tax, 
is the target rate of return” (ibid., p. 139, author’s emphasis). 
Perhaps more interesting though for the purposes of the present paper is Eichner’s discussion 
of what this view of the target rate and its relation to the growth of the corporation implies 
about the investment decisions of the corporation. Here also we find a concurrence with the 
propositions put forward by Clifton; in particular, the view that the “firm” has evolved in 
such a manner so as to allow the competition at the industry level to serve the interests of the 
corporation and in particular the corporation’s desired growth rate. In Eichner’s words 
“the megacorp’s goal is to expand at the highest rate possible … To expand at the highest 
rate possible, the megacorp follows two rules: (a) it attempts to retain its present share of 
the market in the industries to which it already belongs – as long as those industries are 
expanding at the same rate as the economy or better, and (b) it periodically expands into 
newer, more rapidly growing industries while withdrawing from those in which the 
growth of sales has come to a halt and/or the profit margin has been squeezed below the 
firm’s target rate of return” (ibid., p. 137). 
The picture that emerges from Eichner’s analysis is one in which the multi-divisional 
corporation expands and contracts its constituent parts (the production divisions which 
represent its incumbency in different industries) as well as periodically adding/creating new 
parts so as to maximize its growth. The role of the target rate of return in this picture appears 
                                               
6 White (1998) makes use of a simple three-commodity model to consider the different possibilities with respect 
to pricing: specifically, whether “firms” set mark-ups or target rates of return. One argument which may be 
advanced against the idea of an “exogenous” rates of profit in the form of a pre-determined target rate of return, 
it that these target rates may be inconsistent with prices/mark-ups allowed by forces of competition within 
certain industries – and that under certain conditions the rate of profit has to fall into line with the mark-ups or 
prices allowed for by competition. Viewed from this angle, another way of looking at Eichner’s point above is 
that the development of the modern corporation in some sense circumvents this tendency with its ability to 
contract and expand its operations in different sectors, as a means of generating an actual corporate rate of return 
consistent with the target. 
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to be as a standard with which the prospective rate of return across different divisions of the 
corporation could be compared and by which the required degree of expansion (or 
contraction) is assessed.7 In turn, this role reflects the fact (in Eichner’s view) that the target 
rate is a measure of the long-run8
The obvious question then is what determines the desired rate of growth of the corporation. 
Conceivably, this rate could not be greater than the anticipated long-run growth rates for the 
fastest growing or newly emerging sectors in the economy. 
 financial requirement for growth at the corporation’s 
desired rate.  
9
(i)  the extent to which the divisions which constitute the corporation’s production 
activities correspond to the anticipated growth rates of the fastest growing sectors; 
and, 
 Arguably the latter would set the 
upper limit on the maximum attainable growth rate for the corporation. Accepting this 
proposition one could then argue that the corporation’s perceived attainable growth rate of 
the corporation comes close to the anticipated growth of fastest growing or newly emerging 
sectors in the economy depending on two factors: 
(ii) the scope for restructuring the production activities of the corporation in line with the 
anticipated average growth rates for the economy; in particular, by either increasing 
market share in industries which are expected to decline relative to the rest of the 
economy or shunting resources (profit) away from investment in these sectors.  
Interpreting the desired rate of growth as the perceived maximum attainable long-run rate of 
growth, the desired rate might then be seen as falling within a range set at the maximum by 
the anticipated growth rates for newly emerging sectors reflecting perceived long-term 
structural changes within the economy; and a minimum set by the anticipated long-run 
average for the economy. The attainable rate of growth will be higher to the extent that some 
or all of the industries in which the corporation is an incumbent are expected to be the fastest 
growing sectors in the economy. Thus one might also suppose that the desired rate of growth 
will take on a spectrum of values across different corporations; and by implication so would 
the range of corporate target rates of return. 
This proposition raises two interesting questions in relation to a Sraffian approach to prices 
and distribution. First, if the target rate of return and thus the rate of profit is governed by 
anticipated growth rates, how does this fit with the Sraffian critique of the neo-Keynesian 
view that the rate of profit is influenced by the growth rate? Second, how does the view 
                                               
7 This again runs parallel to Clifton’s interpretation of the strategy developed by Donaldson Brown at General 
Motors (Clifton, 1983, pp. 28-29).  
8 The use of the term “long-run” is important here, as illustrated in the following comment by Clifton in relation 
to the system developed at General Motors: “[i]t was the average, long-run return on a long-lived asset that was 
measured by the economic return attainable, not the temporary highs and lows in profits associated with 
fluctuation in volume over the business cycle” (1983, p. 28).  
9 The discussion at this point is obviously ignoring the multi-national dimension, viz., that the maximum desired 
growth could not be faster than the maximum rate of growth allowed for by the growth of related industries in 
other economies. 
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suggested above, including a spectrum of target rates, fit with the research on the dynamics of 
classical competition, specifically research on so-called “cross-dual dynamics”? We take up 
each of these questions in turn. 
5. The target rate of return and the Sraffian criticism of post-Keynesian 
  growth theory 
As is well known, the Sraffian position on the relationship between accumulation and the rate 
of profit (Garegnani (1992) and Kurz (1990)) - at least with respect to the Cambridge growth 
equation - is that this equation could not be seen as a way of determining the normal rate of 
profit consistent with the acceptance of the Keynesian principle of effective demand in the 
long-run. If the rate of profit in that equation is to be understood as the normal rate of profit, 
and thus reckoned on the basis of a utilization rate equal to normal, the rate of accumulation 
could not refer to the actual level. If it did, this would imply an actual rate of utilization equal 
to normal and thus presuppose that investment was governed by the flow of saving at normal 
utilization. This criticism also involves a rejection of the notion that changes in the rate of 
capital accumulation necessarily require changes in income distribution; and that the rate of 
accumulation cannot be defined independently of relative prices and therefore of the rate of 
profit.  
At first sight it may appear that the proposition that the rate of profit, albeit in the form of the 
target rate of return, is governed by the expected growth rate runs counter to this Sraffian 
criticism. On closer reflection however, this is less clear. A couple of points are worth 
making in this regard. First, the notion that it is the perceived attainable long-run rate of 
growth which determines the target rate of return would appear – at least, viewed through the 
work of Clifton and Eichner – to be a rate of growth which is intended to entail an 
appropriate rate of growth of productive capacity. In other words, it would be the rate of 
growth which on average would yield a utilization rate consistent with that which was 
desired; viz., a normal rate of capacity utilization. It is this rate of growth which would, in our 
interpretation of Eichner’s view, be financed by the target rate, itself intended to be achieved 
at a “standard” operating rate. In this sense there is no necessary suggestion of the actual rate 
of growth at any point in time determining the rate of profit which would act as a regulator of 
relative prices. 
What role there is for the actual rate of growth to influence the target rate is via the former’s 
influence over perceptions about future rates of growth. To the extent that the target rate of 
return is calculated on the basis of normal utilization – and in turn allows for fluctuations in 
volumes – then it is difficult to see why the attainable growth rate would not similarly be 
calculated with full allowance for fluctuations in the actual growth rate from period to 
period.10
                                               
10 By implication, there is no support in this view for the argument that changes in the growth rate bring about 
changes in the rate of profit by means of long-run changes in capacity utilization. The role for changes in the 
latter is only via changes in the normal utilization rate; and as others (Garegnani, 1992, Ciccone, 1985, 1986, 
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Second, the view of the target rate of return above does however quite obviously allow a 
determining role for the perceived long-run growth of the economy in the distribution of 
income. This certainly appears to place it at odds with Gargnani’s argument that 
distributional changes are not necessary for changes in the long-run rate of accumulation. But 
nothing in the view of previous sections is inconsistent with Garegnani’s argument that the 
system has within it sufficient elasticity to adapt saving to a changes in the growth rate of 
investment without necessitating a change in the rate of profit. To the extent that margins of 
desired spare capacity provide this elasticity is not ruled out by those earlier arguments. 
The discussion of previous sections does however suggest that a faster rate of accumulation, 
to the extent that it raises the anticipated long-run growth rate of the economy, and with it 
desired corporate growth rates, will also bring with it a rise in the target rate of return. 
6. The target rate, growth and classical cross-dual dynamics 
It was suggested above that, depending on the perceptions of growth among different 
corporations, desired corporate growth rates and thus target rates of return could differ; 
though these differences themselves are conceivably limited by the extent of divergent views 
about future growth rates of the economy. This suggests a difference in profit rates 
independently of restrictions on the ability of capital to exploit differential profit rates.11
The view of earlier sections is also suggestive of another obstacle to the exploitation of profit 
rate differentials between different spheres of production and one which is probably best 
described as a type of mobility barrier and reflects limitations on what have been called 
“economies of scope”. The economies in question are associated with diversification by the 
corporation into related product areas and reflect “competitive advantages created by the 
coordinated learned routines in production, distribution and marketing” (Chandler, 1992,  
pp. 92-93). 
  
The literature on the history of the modern corporation has however made clear the flipside to 
these advantages in the form of competitive disadvantages associated with too rapid a 
diversification into unrelated product areas. In particular, Scheifer and Vishny (1991) mount 
the argument that diversification into unrelated product areas may not be an efficient strategy 
under some circumstances. A related point is made by Scott (1973) regarding evidence which 
suggests that for the 1950’s and 1960’s “unrelated diversification [was] also a low-
performance strategy” (p.144). Scott’s analysis suggests that the highest return strategy and 
structure for this period was diversification into related product areas with a  divisional 
structure in place (ibid., pp. 143-44). In turn, this analysis of takeovers during the 1960’s and 
1980’s has led  Chandler to conclude that “[t]oday the product lines of large multi-product 
industrial firms have become far more focused on their core capabilities” (Chandler, 1992, 
p.98). 
                                                                                                                                                  
White, 1996a) have argued, the nature of any such change would be complex and dependent on the effect of 
changes in the long-run rate accumulation on the perceived amplitude and frequency of fluctuations in demand. 
11 Arguably, not unlike those differences in risk and illiquidity associated with investment in different spheres of 
production. 
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The significance of this aspect of corporate development for the present paper is to identify a 
particular type of restriction on mobility which would limit the extent to which corporate 
capital could eliminate profit rate differentials. More precisely, while the development of the 
corporation strengthens the forces which regulate the relative profitability of different spheres 
of production (in the manner described by Clifton) in which the corporation is an incumbent, 
the limitations on economies of scope presumably act as a limit on the extent of competition 
between corporations within product lines. In this way, the limitations on economies of scope 
may limit the pressure for corporate target rates of return to converge.  
However, while limitations on economies of scope act as an obstacle to the elimination of 
differentials in target rates, the earlier suggestion that the target rate is dictated by desired 
growth rate itself suggests a limit on the divergence of target rates. The explanation of the 
rate of profit in terms of the target rate of return also implies that the spread of target rates of 
return would reflect the spread of desired growth rates amongst corporations. If one accepts 
the earlier proposition (p.9) that the corporate desired growth rate will generally lie between 
the average anticipated rate for the economy and the anticipated growth rates for newly 
emerging sectors, the spread of corporate target rates is then limited by the disparity in 
growth rates between the fastest growing sectors and the average for the economy as a 
whole.12
This conception is also pertinent to the issue of classical competition and the convergence of 
profit rates, examined formally over the last twenty five years in models of cross-dual 
dynamics (cf., Caminati, 1990, White, 1996b). In the “standard” view of cross-dual 
dynamics, growth of each sector depends on the relative profit rate and the profit rate 
responds to changes in the growth rate of each sector. Hence, growth increases in the high 
profit rate sector thus increasing supply relative to demand, in turn depressing relative price 
and the rate of profit. 
  
In the analysis of Eichner and others however the rate of profit – in the form of a target rate 
of return - is set by the desired corporate rate of growth, itself governed by expectations of 
the attainable long-run growth rate for the corporation. The objective in this view is to expand 
into areas which allow one to maintain the corporate target rate of return and in doing so 
attain that desired corporate rate of growth.  
Thus, as noted earlier, the picture is one of a world of large corporations each centered 
around a particular product grouping or traditional area which is the “historical core” of its 
business activity. Following the suggestions of  Eichner, within the core traditional sectors 
which are not declining relative to the economy as a whole and in which the corporation has a 
significant, major and strong market share, capacity is expanded in line with expected growth 
in demand to maintain that market share. For corporations to realise their desired growth rate 
they must contract their activities in areas which are expanding slower than the economy on 
average assuming the corporation wants to grow at a rate at least as fast as the average rate 
                                               
12 Indeed, one would expect there to be some correspondence between the spread of growth rates of demand and 
capacity and the spread of profit rates in models of cross-dual dynamics. 
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for the economy as a whole. And this contraction can only be avoided to the extent that the 
corporation extends sufficiently into sectors which are growing faster than the economy’s 
average. Put another way, the latter allows for a faster growth of the corporation consistent 
with internal financing; while not contracting operations in sectors in which growth is 
slowing relative to the average would be consistent with the maintenance of the existing 
corporate rate of growth or higher only with increased reliance on external finance or a higher 
corporate target rate of return.13
In the cross-dual dynamics literature this faster growth in capacity in response to faster 
growth in demand in some sectors would be driven by a higher than average rate of profit; the 
latter generated by a relative price signal itself triggered by the preceding expansion of 
demand relative to capacity in that industry. In the picture sketched in this paper however 
relative price movements become less of a signal determining relative profit rates and driving 
inter-industry capital mobility. They are instead more of an outcome of the process of 
intersectoral capital mobility and dictated by pre-determined target rates of return. In turn this 
may suggest less “interference” in the gravitation process from seemingly perverse effects of 
relative prices on profit rate differentials.
 
14
7. Competition and macroeconomics: a classical/Sraffian perspective 
  
So what implications if any flow from the discussion so far concerning the relation between 
competition and macroeconomic outcomes? As suggested in the introductory section, this 
question is not without interest for the Sraffian research program - as the basis of an 
alternative to orthodoxy -  given the prominence of this issue in orthodox macro analysis of 
the last thirty years.   
There are two key respects in which the preceding discussion has a bearing on this issue. 
Both relate to the claim within the so-called New Keynesian literature that imperfect 
competition when combined with rigidities in prices provides scope for aggregate demand 
shocks to impact on output and employment (e.g. Mankiw, 1988; Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
1987, Dixon and Rankin, 1994). This has been heralded (e.g. Mankiw, 1990) by the so-called 
‘New Keynesians’ as the definitive modern theoretical foundation for the Keynesian premise 
that output and employment can be constrained by aggregate demand and in turn that there is 
                                               
13 The latter may well be inconsistent with increasing or even maintaining market share in declining markets. 
14 For example, an increase in the rate of profit relative to the average for the higher profit rate sector as it 
expands and pushes down the relative price of its output. This may arise because of the nature of the use of the 
commodity in question relative to its use in other sectors, being such that as its relative price falls this impacts 
sufficiently on its costs of production so that it does not adversely affect it profit rate relative to the average. 
 Ruling out these type of effects does not however guarantee stability of the long-period price vector (associated 
with a uniform rate of profit) (cf.  White, 1996b). 
With regard to relative price changes taking on less of a role the cross-dual dynamic process, it is interesting to 
note the comment from Clifton that, “[w]ether corporations maintain prices at their normal (equilibrium) levels 
over time or enable prices to fluctuate around their normal level at frequent intervals is really a very secondary 
question to which no general answer is possible over the long-run” (1983, p. 37). 
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scope for demand management policy to impact on output and employment, at least in the 
short-run. 
One of the more well known examples of this position is that of Mankiw (1988). Mankiw 
derives a positive relation between the degree of product market imperfection and the 
income-expenditure multiplier: a higher degree of imperfect competition is identified with a 
larger price-cost margin, viz., a larger excess of price over cost as a proportion of price.  
 
This orthodox view is open to attack on a number of fronts. First, and most well known is the 
Sraffian critique of the underlying premise in this orthodox literature that price flexibility 
would allow market forces to push a capitalist economy to full-employment (Garegnani, 
1978; Eatwell and Milgate, 1983). Once that premise is removed, explaining why demand 
shocks have an impact on output by reference to a combination of product market 
imperfections and price rigidities becomes highly questionable. Second, as noted in Vera 
(2006) and White (2008), once the impacts of a change in income distribution on aggregate 
demand are accounted for, a systematic positive relation between the multiplier and the 
degree of product market imperfection need not hold. Third, and of particular relevance to 
Mankiw’s argument, identifying the degree of competition with price-cost margins (price less 
cost as a percentage of unit price) rather than profit rates is problematic. The movement of 
price-cost margins (or mark-ups defined as price less cost as a percentage of cost) need not 
correspond exactly with the movement of profit rates.15
This last criticism however raises a more fundamental question that is closer to the arguments 
advanced in this paper and has to do with measuring the degree of competition and how this 
bears on attempts to link the degree of competition with macro outcomes. The earlier 
discussion refers to three levels of competition: (i) competition between production units 
producing substitute commodities; (ii) competition between production units across industries 
for shares in the corporate surplus; and (iii) competition between corporate centres of capital. 
When one seeks to define the degree of competition one is confronted with the question as to 
which of these three levels one should use. Looking at intra-industry competition, 
concentration and the prevalence of so-called “administered pricing” practices may highlight 
the significance of the concept of imperfect competition defined in orthodox terms. However 
looked at from Clifton’s perspective for example as well as Eichner’s, the mature 
development of capitalism goes hand in hand with an increasing dominance of (ii) over (i); 
i.e. the features of individual industries which seemingly correspond to orthodox definitions 
of imperfect competition - product differentiation, concentration, administered pricing – are 
dominated or controlled by forces of competition across divisions/industries for shares in the 
corporate surplus. More to the point, if indeed (ii) above does increasingly come to dominate 
 Yet it is profit rates rather than price-
cost margins which are arguably the critical variable in terms of analyzing the dominant and 
persistent forces at work in the economic system. Certainly, as argued in section 2 above, for 
the task of defining degrees of competition, one could well start in by reference to the degree 
to which the tendency for profit rates to come to uniformity is dominant 
                                               
15 Cf. White, 2008. 
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(i) the exercise of measuring competition or the degree of “product market imperfection” by 
reference to (i) above (e.g. in terms of demand elasticities) looks wholly inadequate.  
By implication, analyses of the ‘welfare’ implications of competition even where they are 
restricted to an orthodox welfare criterion (e.g. consumption per head) would also appear 
inadequate to the extent that those implications are derived exclusively with regard to 
different levels of intra-industry competition; notwithstanding the difficulties with those 
welfare arguments in their own right.16
An alternative perspective referred to above – in terms of the dominance of competition for 
shares in the corporate surplus over intra-industry competition – does suggest a link between 
competition and macro outcomes, but running in the reverse direction from that of the New 
Keynesian literature. To the extent that this increasing dominance means more widespread 
use of target return pricing based on perceived attainable long-run rates of return, then 
arguably the greater the influence of the anticipated long-run growth rate of the economy 
over the rate of profit and thus on relative prices and income distribution. This link runs in 
other words from the macro level to relative prices and distribution. And the strength of that 
link would reflect at least in part the significance of corporate target rates as a determinant of  
sectoral rates of profit.  
 
8. Intra-industry competition and a Sraffian view 
But does a classical/Sraffian based approach have insights to offer about intra-industry 
competition (i.e. competition on level (i) above), apart from the suggestion that it is likely to 
be dominated by the competition at the inter-industry (for want of a better term) level? In the 
author’s view the answer to this question is yes, in two respects. 
The first is the flexibility a Sraffian model allows in respect of the pricing decision. As 
demonstrated in White, 1998, the very nature of the Sraffian model provides for different 
degrees of competitive pressure, within an industry (or product group), on the individual 
production unit’s pricing decision.  If one considers the normal utilization rate - on which the 
rate of profit should be reckoned - to be determined on a cost-minimizing basis and thus on 
the basis of relative prices (Ciccone, 1986), then one can arrive formally at a system of 
equations which, given technology, a basic money wage rate and the anticipated cyclical 
characteristics of demand, allows one to determine mark-ups or target rates of return 
exogenously, but not both.  
To the extent that the individual production units concerns about meeting the target rate of  
return are minimal, this may imply that the appropriate exogenous variable is the mark-up 
within an industry; a mark-up consistent with the maintenance of market share within that 
industry. In this case, the rate of return becomes endogenous. On the other hand, increasing 
competitive pressure on a production unit from other divisions within the corporation may 
                                               
16 In other words, even ignoring the inadequacy of welfare analysis solely in terms of intra-industry competition, 
these implications are not easily reproduced in a classical/Sraffian model. This point is taken up briefly in the 
following section. 
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require that the mark-up conform with the long-term corporate target rate of return. This may 
only be consistent with the limits on pricing imposed by intra-industry competition to the 
extent that the production unit is able to lower unit costs of production. To the extent that this 
is not a viable option and the mark-up dictated by intra-industry competition and the 
maintenance of market share is incompatible with a corporate target rate of return, then, as 
Clifton notes, quoting Brown, “the result may be a deliberate restriction upon further 
expansion [by the corporation in that industry], or even curtailment of volume with release of 
capital for employment in more profitable channels” (1983, p. 27). 
The more general point is that, as suggested in White (1998) and also by Semmler (1983), a 
Sraffian approach is able to accommodate different pricing practices; and in particular, 
different degrees to which pricing is dictated by the requirement of a corporate target rate of 
return and thus different degrees to which competition from within the corporation may come 
to dominate intra-industry competition.   
The second type of insight which a Sraffian based approach might bring to the analysis of 
intra-industry competition is with respect to a key defining feature (for orthodoxy) of 
imperfect competition – product differentiation. As demonstrated in White, 2009, there are 
two dimensions to an analysis of product differentiation in a Sraffian model: the first 
concerns the relation between product differentiation on the one hand and the basic, non-
basic distinction on the other hand. The second involves the possibility of insights into the so-
called ‘welfare’ implications associated with imperfect competition derived in an orthodox 
framework.  
With respect to the first of these dimensions, one can start from the assumption that product 
differentiation entails the appearance of additional production processes corresponding to the 
differentiated products and as a consequence additional price; and that demand for what in 
the absence of such differentiation would have been one commodity is now split between a 
number of commodities. In other words, a Sraffian approach to the analysis of product 
differentiation would conceivably start from the premise that the production of differentiated 
commodities involves the use of different combinations of inputs, even if only to generate the 
perception in consumers’ minds of difference (e.g. via resources devoted to marketing). 
With respect to non-basics – e.g. pure consumption goods – the analysis is straightforward 
and whether or not product differentiation entails “higher prices” compared with its absence 
depends on the differences in the combinations of inputs in the production of the 
differentiated commodities.  
With respect to basic commodities, the analysis of product differentiation is more complex. 
This is examined in White, 2009, by means of a simplified two-sector circulating capital 
model. The conclusion there is that in order for there to exist one price system, there must be 
at least one “undifferentiated basic” commodity: in this case, differentiated circulating capital 
goods being used in the production of differentiated consumer goods for example would be 
associated with different non-basic sub-systems within the overall price system (pp. 10-13).  
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So what of the welfare implications of product differentiation? This question goes to the 
traditional orthodox argument which attributes higher prices and lower output to imperfectly 
competitive markets; a key characteristic of the imperfectly competitive firm’s ability to 
affect price being the presence of product differentiation. One way of answering this question 
is to consider the implications of product differentiation for net product per worker; and one 
can do this in terms of what is a fairly standard choice of technique analysis. White (2009) 
shows in this regard that with product differentiation involving different methods in the 
production of both circulating capital and the consumer good, there is similarly nothing 
definite to be said a priori regarding the direction of change in net product per worker and (to 
the extent that this can be taken as a proxy for consumption per head) ‘welfare’ as a result of 
the appearance of differentiated products. Moreover, this result appears also to hold even 
where the product differentiation is accompanied by a rise in the rate of profit. 
The upshot of such an analysis combined with the discussion of earlier sections may be put as 
follows: not only is the competition across industries or product groups more general basis 
for defining the degree of competition; the significance of a key defining characteristic of 
intra-industry competition from an orthodox perspective is much less clear from a Sraffian  
perspective. 
9. Concluding notes 
The preceding discussion is an attempt to clarify the basis for a classical/Sraffian perspective 
on competition: how it should be defined or measured and its connection with the 
determination of the prices of the Sraffian system. Starting from the work of both Clifton and 
Semmler it was suggested that competition should be defined in terms of a hierarchy of levels 
with the intensity of competition best measured in terms of the degree of dominance of 
competition for shares in the corporate surplus over intra-industry competition. It was also 
suggested that this view inevitably points to the rate of profit as reflecting the target rate of 
return; and, following Eichner’s analysis, this in turn reflecting the desired corporate growth 
rate. 
As discussed, the implied link between growth and target rates poses a question of 
consistency in relation to the Sraffian critique of the neo-Keynesian explanation of the rate of 
profit by reference to the growth rate. It was argued however that there is no necessary 
problem of consistency between the target rate and hence rate of profit determined via the 
desired growth rate on the one hand and this Sraffian critique on the other. As well, this 
determination of the rate of profit and its link with the growth rate may provide for some 
clarification of the nature of classical cross-dual dynamics. 
Moreover, the link between the target rate and anticipated growth provides a link running 
from the macro level to relative prices and is a counterpoint to the New Keynesian arguments 
of recent decades regarding the role of imperfect competition in accounting for the effects of 
aggregate demand shocks. Further, it was argued that these orthodox arguments are also 
thrown into question by an alternative classical/Sraffian perspective on defining competition. 
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